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INTRODUCTION
The history of drug prohibitions and enforcement efforts in the United
States always reflects a kind of federalism in action. Because the federal
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government always lacks the resources and often lacks the political will to
fully enforce drug prohibitions nationwide, state laws and local practices
will inevitably shape and color the full picture of U.S. drug policy and
enforcement. When alcohol Prohibition was written into our nation’s
Constitution, for example, state and local officials embraced an array of
different approaches to enforcing temperance, which produced a patchwork
of on-the-ground practices across the nation.1
In modern times, marijuana prohibitions and reforms present the most
salient and dynamic examples of national drug policies reflecting diverse
and sometimes clashing federal and state laws and local practices. Though
some commentators have explored how federal marijuana prohibition has
shaped state reform efforts and local enforcement realities,2 few have
focused attention on the most tangible and arguably most consequential
aspect of federal enforcement, namely federal sentences imposed for
marijuana activity. This Essay seeks to document and examine critically
the remarkable recent decline in the number of federal marijuana sentences
imposed as states have begun fully legalizing marijuana for all uses by
adults.
This Essay begins with a brief overview of marijuana reform history to
set the context for examining modern federal marijuana prohibition
enforcement patterns. Even while formal federal marijuana law has
persisted unchanged amid state-level reforms, federal marijuana
enforcement on the ground has changed dramatically. Drawing on data
from the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC), this Essay details the new
federal enforcement patterns that emerged when states started fully
legalizing marijuana. The data reveal some trends that reform advocates
would likely consider encouraging (e.g., a sharp reduction in federal
marijuana sentences)3 as well as some likely to be viewed as discouraging
(e.g., the evolving demographics of those federally sentenced).4 This Essay

1. See generally LISA MCGIRR, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF
(2016); Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of
the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1 (2006). For an interesting account of a single state’s enforcement experience during
alcohol prohibition, see Phil Roberts, Regulating Liquor: Prohibition Enforcement, Official
Corruption, and State Efforts to Control Alcohol After Prohibition Repeal, 12 WYO. L. REV.
389, 389–420 (2012).
2. For just a small sample of recent coverage on these topics, see generally M ARIJUANA
FEDERALISM: UNCLE SAM AND MARY JANE (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2020); DOUGLAS A.
BERMAN & ALEX KREIT, MARIJUANA LAW AND POLICY ch. 3 (2020); Robert A. Mikos, The
Evolving Federal Response to State Marijuana Reforms, 26 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2020);
Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L.
REV. 74 (2015).
3. See infra Section II.A.
4. See infra Section II.D.
THE AMERICAN STATE
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concludes with questions about the future of federal marijuana policies and
practices and their impact on the populations historically subject to
disproportionate punitive marijuana enforcement.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERSECTING FEDERAL AND STATE
MARIJUANA PROHIBITIONS AND REFORMS
Marijuana was not subject to criminal law for most of U.S. history as
farmers grew industrial cannabis known as hemp, and doctors used
marijuana as an ingredient in patent medicines and home remedies.5 But
when white citizens came to associate marijuana use with Mexicans in the
early 1900s, numerous state legislatures started to criminalize the drug.6
The federal government, though mostly focused on alcohol Prohibition,
began regulating drugs in this era. Congress created the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics in 1930, and its leader, Harry Anslinger, used racialized
advocacy to cast marijuana as a menace.7 Seemingly because he feared his
position and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics were in political jeopardy
after the end of alcohol Prohibition, Anslinger in the mid-1930s “declared
[a] war on marijuana” and for decades advocated for punitive criminal
justice responses to drug policy issues.8 In particular, Anslinger first
pushed Congress to pass the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act,9 after which he
urged states to criminalize and enhance punishments for marijuana;
Anslinger’s advocacy ultimately advanced the 1951 Boggs Act, which
created federal mandatory minimum prison sentences for possession of
marijuana and other drugs.10

5. See generally MITCH EARLEYWINE,
THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 3–14 (2002).

UNDERSTANDING MARIJUANA: A NEW LOOK

AT

6. See Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread, II, The Forbidden Fruit and the
Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition,
56 VA. L. REV. 971, 1012 (1970); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE,
MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 14 (1972) [hereinafter SIGNAL OF
MISUNDERSTANDING].
7. See JOHN HUDAK, MARIJUANA: A SHORT HISTORY 25–26 (2016); see also Steven W.
Bender, Joint Reform? The Interplay of State, Federal, and Hemispheric Regulation of
Recreational Marijuana and the Failed War on Drugs, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 359, 360–64
(2013) (detailing how “[p]rejudices against both [B]lacks and Mexicans” were catalysts for
early marijuana criminalization efforts).
8. See Rebecca Carroll, Under the Influence: Harry Anslinger’s Role in Shaping
America’s Drug Policy, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND
PRACTICE 61, 70 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds., 2004).
9. For an extended discussion of the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, see
Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 6, at 1048–62.
10. See Phil Nicholas & Andrew Churchill, The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the States,
and the Origins of Modern Drug Enforcement in the United States, 1950–1962, 39
CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 595, 599 (2012).
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Despite the enactment of new criminal statutes and punishments at the
federal and state level, enforcement of marijuana prohibition was still
limited into the 1960s.11 However, then-President Richard Nixon entered
the Oval Office on a law-and-order platform with a focus on drug
enforcement: in 1969, he told Congress that drug abuse was “a serious
national threat to the personal health and safety of millions of
Americans,”12 and in 1971, he pronounced drugs “public enemy number
one.”13 Notably, Nixon Administration officials have suggested his
decision to wage a “war on drugs” was driven by a desire to target political
enemies and racial minorities.14
Prodded by President Nixon, Congress passed the Controlled Substances
Act (CSA) in 1970, which regulated the use, production, distribution, and
sale of certain drugs.15 In some respects, the CSA marked an improvement
in federal drug laws; the Act replaced or amended patchwork federal drug
control statutes (some of which carried severe punishments)16 and
prioritized scientific and medical determinations for creating distinct drug
classes.17 However, Congress opted to classify marijuana as a Schedule I
drug presenting “a high potential for abuse” and “no currently accepted
medical use” in the CSA; scheduled with drugs like LSD and heroin, this

11. See James B. Slaughter, Marijuana Prohibition in the United States: History and
Analysis of a Failed Policy, 21 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 417, 420–21 (1988). As late as
1965, there were still only roughly 20,000 annual total arrests for marijuana offenses
throughout the United States. See id.
12. President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on the Control of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 14, 1969),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-controlnarcotics-and-dangerous-drugs#:~:text=Special%20Message%20to%20the%20Congr
ess%20on%20Control%20of%20Narcotics%20and%20Dangerous%20Drugs.,-July
%2014%2C%201969&text=To%20the%20Congress%20of%20the,safety%20of%20
millions%20of%20Americans [https://perma.cc/KH6F-XPNU].
13. President Richard M. Nixon, Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse
Prevention
and
Control, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(June 17,
1971),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-about-intensified-program-for-drugabuse-prevention-and-control [https://perma.cc/GE7R-SZBM].
14. See Dan Baum, Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs, HARPER’S MAG.,
Apr. 2016, (discussing comments by Nixon aide John Ehrlichman suggesting “Nixon’s
invention of the war on drugs [was] a political tool”).
15. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904.
16. See Molly M. Gill, Correcting Course: Lessons from the 1970 Repeal of Mandatory
Minimums, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 55, 56–57 (2008) (discussing the federal mandatory
minimum sentencing provisions appearing in the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics
Control Act of 1956).
17. For a review of the CSA’s improvement on what it superseded, see generally
Thomas M. Quinn & Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolution of Federal Drug Control
Legislation, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 586 (1973).
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classification made any manufacture or distribution of marijuana a serious
federal criminal offense.18
The CSA’s classification of marijuana contradicted the recommendation
of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, known as “the
Shafer Commission,” which advocated in 1972 for decriminalizing
personal use of marijuana.19 The Shafer Commission called criminal law
“too harsh a tool to apply” to personal marijuana use because it leads to
users being “stigmatized as criminals, incurring the economic and social
consequences of involvement with the criminal law.”20 A dozen states
responded to the Shafer Commission’s recommendation; throughout the
1970s, legislatures in states ranging from Maine to Mississippi, Ohio to
Oregon, and California to New York, enacted various forms of marijuana
decriminalization.21
However, at the federal level, the Nixon
Administration rejected the Shafer Commission’s decriminalization
recommendation,22 and blanket federal prohibition of marijuana in any and
all forms has remained the law of the land for the ensuing half century.
The modern state marijuana reform movement started in 1996, when the
citizens of Arizona and California voted to legalize marijuana for medical
use.23 Within the next decade, nearly a dozen additional states approved
ballot initiatives or enacted traditional legislation to create various means to
permit certain persons to access marijuana for medical purposes.24

18. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10–12 (2005)
(reviewing placement of marijuana as a Schedule I drug).
19. See SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 6, at 176, 184.
20. Id. at 140–46.
21. See Wayne A. Logan, After the Cheering Stopped: Decriminalization and
Legalism’s Limits, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 324–25 (2014) (reviewing
marijuana decriminalization developments in the 1970s). Though most decriminalization
laws enacted in the 1970s remain in place, limited research on these reforms provide a
mixed and muddled picture of their impact. See generally Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Jamie F.
Chriqui & Joanna King, Marijuana Decriminalization: What Does It Mean in the United
States? 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 9690, 2003),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w9690/w9690.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8N8-M2DZ].
22. See generally HUDAK, supra note 7, at ch. 4.
23. See Alex Kreit & Aaron Marcus, Raich, Health Care, and the Commerce Clause, 31
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 957, 962–63 (2005); see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632
(9th Cir. 2002). The Arizona initiative proved largely ineffective because it called for a
doctor’s prescription, whereas California’s initiative only required “the recommendation of
a physician.” See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 11362.5(b)(1)(B) (West 2022). A federal
court later ruled that the First Amendment protects doctors from professional sanctions for
simply recommending marijuana to their patients. See Walters, 309 F.3d at 639.
24. See generally Troy E. Grandel, One Toke over the Line: The Proliferation of State
Medical Marijuana Laws, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 135, 139–49 (2010) (reviewing state medical
marijuana laws enacted between 1996 and 2010). Though the number of states with medical
marijuana laws on the books continued to grow after California pioneered reforms in 1996,
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However, the federal government during this period still sought to block
the implementation of state medical marijuana laws in ways that included
raids and prosecutions of medical marijuana dispensaries,25 as well as
successful defenses of blanket federal prohibition in two distinct challenges
before the U.S. Supreme Court.26
In 2009, the trajectory of federal enforcement and state reforms was
significantly altered when the Obama Administration issued its first
memorandum signaling it would not prioritize federal prosecution of
citizens “in clear and unambiguous compliance” with state laws unless
conduct conflicted with “core federal enforcement priorities.”27 This
policy, which followed up on President Barack Obama’s campaign promise
to end federal raids on medical marijuana facilities, had a profound impact
on the development of state medical marijuana programs. Many public and
private actors viewed this 2009 memo as a green light to develop medical
marijuana programs in the states without federal interference, and the
modern marijuana industry began to flourish.28
As medical marijuana reform picked up momentum, advocates and
industry players began discussing state ballot measures to legalize the use
of marijuana by all adults. A failed first proposition in California in 2010
provided key lessons for reform advocates who succeeded in securing voter
approval of full legalization in Colorado and Washington in 2012.29 While
states geared up regulatory rules for state marijuana businesses, the Justice
Department issued another memorandum in August 2013 indicating a
disinclination to prosecute state-compliant marijuana actors whose

very few states had functioning medical marijuana industries. See HUDAK, supra note 7, at
145. In Nevada, for example, the state’s first medical marijuana dispensary did not open
until 2015, even though voters approved a medical marijuana constitutional amendment
back in 2000, because legislators were resistant to enacting effective implementing
legislation. See id. at 137–48.
25. See AMS. FOR SAFE ACCESS, WHAT’S THE CO$T? THE FEDERAL WAR ON PATIENTS 37
(2013),
https://american-safe-access.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/WhatsTheCost.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JRL9-TPHJ] (“Over the past 17 years, the Justice Department has carried
out over 500 aggressive SWAT-style raids on medical cannabis patients and providers,
arrested nearly 400 people, and prosecuted more than 160 cases.”).
26. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24 (2005); see also United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 497–98 (2001).
27. See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to
all
U.S.
Att’ys
(Oct.
19,
2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default
/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2WK-MMU9].
28. See Paul Lewis, A Gateway to Future Problems: Concerns About the State-By-State
Legalization of Medical Marijuana, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 49, 62–63 (2015); see also Brian J.
Fairman, Trends in Registered Medical Marijuana Participation Across 13 US States and
District of Columbia, 159 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 72 (2016) (detailing sharp
increases in registered medical marijuana patients in multiple states after 2009).
29. See Bender, supra note 7, 373–75.
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activities did not threaten federal enforcement priorities.30 In addition to
prodding further regulatory development in Colorado and Washington, this
memo emboldened advocates, industry players, and state officials around
the country to move forward with various marijuana reform efforts.31
Ballot initiatives authorizing recreational use of marijuana moved ahead
and were approved in 2014 by voters in Alaska, Oregon, and Washington,
D.C.; in the 2016 election cycle, similar ballot initiatives were also
approved in California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada; in 2018,
Michigan voters added their state to the legalization list; and similar ballot
initiatives were approved by voters in Arizona, Montana, New Jersey, and
South Dakota in the November 2020 election.32 In addition, since early
2018, Connecticut, Illinois, New Mexico, New York, Vermont, and
Virginia have all enacted adult-use marijuana legalization regimes through
the traditional legislative process.33
The federal executive branch’s non-enforcement policy for statecompliant marijuana activity was partially codified when Congress started
enacting appropriations bills with a spending rider prohibiting the U.S.
Department of Justice from interfering with state efforts to implement
medical marijuana programs in 2014.34 These spending riders, which have
been given a relatively broad interpretation by courts,35 fueled further
growth in the number of states developing medical marijuana regimes and
added still more momentum to the broader reform movement by signaling
that Congress was now prepared to formally limit the authority of the
federal government to prosecute certain state-legal marijuana activity.36

30. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to
all U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/47RE-BNU3].
31. See generally Sam Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but How?, 50
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 617, 634–40 (2016).
32. See Claire Hansen, Horus Alas & Elliot Davis, Jr., Where Is Marijuana Legal? A
Guide to Marijuana Legalization, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 6, 2022, 3:25 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/where-is-marijuana-legal-a-guide-tomarijuana-legalization [https://perma.cc/WAG7-CHG5] (providing a list of all legalization
states).
33. See id.
34. The first of these riders was enacted in late 2014 in the Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217.
Similar riders have appeared in subsequent appropriation bills and have been enforced in
courts in various ways. See generally Florence Shu-Acquaye, Rohrabacher-Blumenauer
Amendment, Case Law and the Department of Justice: Who Prevails in the Medical
Marijuana Legalization Debate?, 54 GONZ. L. REV. 127 (2018) (discussing the Ninth
Circuit’s treatment of the appropriations act).
35. See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1178 (9th Cir. 2016).
36. See Hilary Bricken, Funding and Financing a Marijuana Business, 13 SCITECH
LAW. 6, 7 (2017) (suggesting that “investors and medical marijuana businesses” could feel
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The election of Donald Trump in 2016 could have slowed state reform
momentum because it raised uncertainty about federal enforcement
policies, and these policies formally changed in January 2018, when thenAttorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded previous Justice Department
memoranda on marijuana enforcement.37 However, this action actually
generated added political support for state reforms as members of Congress
on both sides of the political aisle criticized the prospect of greater federal
criminal enforcement in reform states,38 and U.S. Attorneys generally did
not increase marijuana enforcement beyond the framework of the previous
non-enforcement memoranda.39
Sessions’ replacement as Attorney
General, William Barr, indicated during his confirmation hearings that he
did not plan to “go after” actors complying with state marijuana laws.40
The 2020 election saw many Democratic presidential candidates
compete over federal marijuana reform proposals,41 and states from coast to
coast passed ballot initiatives to legalize marijuana for medical or adult-use
consumption.42 By summer 2021, 18 states and three U.S. territories had
legalized marijuana for adult recreational use, 36 states and four U.S.

more confident moving forward with industry plans after “Congress in 2014 passed an
appropriations bill that includes a prohibition against the Department of Justice spending
money to interfere with a state’s implementation of medical marijuana laws”). See generally
Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?, 65 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV.
689, 690–91 (2015) (noting that the spending rider suggested that the “executive and
legislative branches [were both] finally coming around to the conclusion that enforcing
federal marijuana prohibition in states that have enacted reform is simply no longer a viable
option”).
37. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to all
U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download
[https://perma.cc/N2HA-9UXS].
38. See James Higdon, Did Jeff Sessions Just Increase the Odds Congress Will Make
Marijuana Legal?, POLITICO (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine
/story/2018/01/06/jeff-sessions-marijuana-legalization-congress-216251/
[https://perma.cc/4TLL-BKG4].
39. See Jill Beathard, Keep Calm and Follow State Law: Marijuana Attorneys React to
Sessions Memo, 95 DENV. L. REV. F. 112, 116 (2018).
40. See Tom Angell, Trump Attorney General Pick Puts Marijuana Enforcement Pledge
in Writing, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2019, 1:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/tomangell/2019/01/28/trump-attorney-general-pick-puts-marijuana-enforcement-pledge-inwriting/?sh=7803dae65435 [https://perma.cc/22W6-QW2T] (quoting former Attorney
General William Barr).
41. See 2020 Presidential Candidates on Marijuana, OHIO ST. UNIV., http://
moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty-and-research/drug-enforcement-and-policy-center/research-andgrants/policy-and-data-analyses/2020-Pres-Candidates-Marijuana [https://perma.cc/CCQ9NTNH] (last visited Dec. 31, 2021).
42. See Drug Reforms on the 2020 Ballot, OHIO ST. UNIV., http://
moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty-and-research/drug-enforcement-and-policy-center/research-andgrants/policy-and-data-analyses/drug-reforms-2020-ballot
[https://perma.cc/BC35-2E6S]
(last visited Dec. 31, 2021).
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territories had laws to enable comprehensive medical marijuana programs,
and nearly every other state allowed the use of low tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC), high cannabidiol (CBD) products for medical reasons.43
In sum, the last quarter century has seen dozens of U.S. states and
territories legalize medical and adult use of marijuana, while blanket
federal prohibition has remained the law of the land — though federal
enforcement policies have evolved in response to changing state laws.
Various commentators have discussed the politics and policies surrounding
the evolution of federal enforcement,44 but few have given focused
attention to the most tangible and arguably most consequential aspect of
federal enforcement practices, namely federal sentences imposed for
marijuana activity. The next Part closely examines this aspect of the
modern federal marijuana enforcement story.
II. MODERN FEDERAL MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT AND SENTENCING
The impact of marijuana prohibitions and the scope of enforcement are
often documented through nationwide arrest data, in part because the
numbers are enormous and in part because there is little other reliable
national information on marijuana enforcement. Interestingly, yearly arrest
data, as collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), have been
dynamic: as arrests for all drug offenses increased during the “war on
drugs” acceleration in the 1980s, the total number of marijuana arrests
actually dipped due to a more aggressive focus on cocaine and heroin.45
Yet, as state marijuana reforms picked up steam, so too did total marijuana
arrests — peaking at over 850,000 arrests in 200746 and averaging over

43. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb 3, 2002),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx
[https://perma.cc/MRX2-622G]. See generally AMS. FOR SAFE ACCESS, 2020 STATE OF THE
STATES REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL CANNABIS ACCESS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2020),
https://american-safe-access.s3.amazonaws.com/sos2020/Stateofthe
States20_Spreads.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD5N-QA39]. An up-to-date list of state marijuana
legalization laws is maintained by the advocacy group NORML. See Legalization, NORML,
http://norml.org/legal/legalization [https://perma.cc/8QL5-DWU8] (last visited Feb. 14,
2022).
44. See generally Alex Kreit, Drug Truce, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1323 (2016); Mikos, supra
note 2; Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937
(2017).
45. See Drugs and Crime Facts, Number of Arrests, By Drug Type, 1982–2007, BUREAU
JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/tables/drugtype.cfm [https://perma.cc/7EVSG2CW] (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
46. See id.; see also Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, The War on Marijuana: The
Transformation of the War on Drugs in the 1990s, 3 HARM REDUCTION J., no. 3, 2006.
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750,000 arrests for more than a dozen years.47 Starting in 2014, total
marijuana arrests showed declines in the FBI data and recently hit a (prepandemic) low of under 550,000 arrests in 2019,48 and then another new
low of just over 350,000 in 2020.49 Disconcertingly, as the American Civil
Liberties Union has documented in a series of reports, one pernicious
consistency in the marijuana arrest data has been racial disparities, where
African Americans were many more times likely than whites to be arrested
for marijuana possession.50
While national arrest patterns tell one story, actual sentences imposed
for marijuana convictions reflect the most significant consequence of
marijuana prohibition’s enforcement. Disappointingly, there seemingly has
been no systematic collection or analysis of marijuana sentencing outcomes
nationwide since the work done by Ryan King and Marc Mauer through the
year 2000.51 Indeed, even with growing attention on marijuana reform,
there is no recent data on how many persons nationwide are incarcerated
for marijuana offenses nor any detailed accounting of the types of offenders
still incarcerated for marijuana activities in the states.52 However, data
assembled by the USSC allows at least a close look at how federal
marijuana enforcement has cashed out since the start of state-level
marijuana reforms in the form of yearly sentencing outcomes.53

47. See ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 49 (2013) [hereinafter
ACLU BLACK & WHITE], https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/1114413mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RNV-QFPL].
48. See Kyle Jaeger, Marijuana Arrests Decline Nationally for First Time in Four
Years,
FBI
Data
Shows,
MARIJUANA
MOMENT
(Oct.
1,
2020),
https://www.marijuanamoment.net/marijuana-arrests-decline-nationally-for-first-time-infour-years-fbi-data-shows/ [https://perma.cc/289D-QDS9].
49. See Kyle Jaeger, Marijuana Arrests Dropped Sharply in 2020 as Both COVID and
Legalization Spread, FBI Data Shows, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Sept. 27, 2021),
https://www.marijuanamoment.net/marijuana-arrests-dropped-sharply-in-2020-as-bothcovid-and-legalization-spread-fbi-data-shows/ [https://perma.cc/5BNV-3LJ6].
50. See ACLU BLACK & WHITE, supra note 47; see also ACLU, A TALE OF TWO
COUNTRIES: RACIALLY TARGETED ARRESTS IN THE ERA OF MARIJUANA REFORM (2020),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/marijuanareport_03232021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HN7D-D7SV].
51. See King & Mauer, supra note 46 (providing a leading, and perhaps the only,
detailed report with analysis of marijuana criminal case processing outcomes from leading
policy analysts).
52. See Zoe Sigman, The Women Fighting for Cannabis Justice and Data Transparency
in the U.S. Prison System, VOGUE (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.vogue.com/article/cannabisjustice-data-transparency-us-prison-system [https://perma.cc/6X62-7SGF] (discussing the
“massive gap in data” that precludes knowing “[h]ow many people are serving time for
cannabis”).
53. Drawn from U.S. Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal
Sentences. See app. H.
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A. The Decline in Federal Marijuana Sentences
The number of marijuana sentences imposed in federal courts actually
climbed significantly for five consecutive years, starting in 1996, after the
first states legalized medical marijuana.54 By 2002, however, the number
of federal marijuana sentences each year had leveled out but remained
consistently high for more than a decade — from 2002 to 2012 — when an
ever-growing number of states were adopting medical marijuana reforms.55
However, over the last decade, coinciding with the emergence of state
adult-use marijuana reforms, there has been a considerable and steady drop
in the number of sentenced federal marijuana defendants and marijuana
cases have composed an ever-smaller percentage of federal drug cases
being sentenced in federal courts. In USSC fiscal year 2020,56 1,129
people were sentenced for trafficking marijuana in federal courts, down
83% from USSC fiscal year 2012.57 In 2012, a full 27.7% of all drug
trafficking cases sentenced in federal court involved marijuana as the
primary drug type; by 2020, only 7% of all drug trafficking cases sentenced
in federal court involved marijuana as the primary drug type.58
While the total number of marijuana cases being sentenced in federal
court has declined, so too has the average prison sentence length and the
number of extreme life or de facto life sentences. In fiscal year 2012,
offenders were sentenced to a median sentence length of 34 months — two
years and ten months — in prison. By 2020, the median sentence length
had dropped to 29 months — two years and five months. Also, from 2012
to 2016, an average of four life or de facto life sentences were imposed
each year on marijuana offenders, but since 2017 only two total such
54. Drawn from U.S. Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal
Sentences. See app. H.
55. See app A.
56. U.S. Sentencing Commission data covers a fiscal year that runs from October 1
through September 30 so that fiscal year 2020 covers data collected from October 1, 2019,
through September 30, 2020.
57. See app. B.
58. The data reported in this section are drawn from various reports and data files
coming from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and available online at U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: MARIJUANA TRAFFICKING OFFENSES (2020) [hereinafter U.S.
SENT’G
COMM’N
2020],
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/quick-facts/Marijuana_FY20.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MFH-6NLX]; U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: MARIJUANA TRAFFICKING OFFENSES (2016) [hereinafter U.S.
SENT’G
COMM’N
2016],
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/quick-facts/Marijuana_FY16.pdf [https://perma.cc/R29F-6HYC]; U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: MARIJUANA TRAFFICKING OFFENSES (2012) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N
2012],
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Marijuana_Trafficking.pdf [https://perma.cc/26UWNMU3] (last visited Feb. 14, 2022). Additional data sources appear in the Appendix of this
Essay. See app. H.
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sentences have been imposed — with none imposed in the last three
years.59
B. The Impact and Import of Many Fewer
Federal Marijuana Sentences
Based on the median length of sentences and number of sentences
imposed as reported by the USSC, there was, collectively, nearly 20,000
total human years of federal imprisonment imposed for marijuana
trafficking in fiscal year 2012 alone.60 Eight years later, despite the fact
that federal law had not changed — and marijuana trafficking activity
likely increased due to state reforms — “only” about 2,700 human years of
federal imprisonment was imposed for marijuana trafficking in fiscal year
2020.61 For a visual comparison, these collective years sentenced are
represented below62 and equate to 245 full human lifespans in 2012 and
“only” 35 lifespans in 2020.63
Declining federal marijuana sentences also means less expected federal
spending committed to incarcerating those convicted of marijuana
trafficking. In fiscal year 2012, at an average annual cost of $37,449 per
inmate each year,64 an estimated $722,000,000 was committed to the
federal imprisonment of those sentenced for marijuana trafficking.65
Expected incarceration expenditures for marijuana trafficking have
declined considerably with the dramatic recent decrease in the number of
sentences imposed, but that should not occlude the fact that significant
costs persist for continued federal marijuana imprisonment in our era of
widespread state marijuana reforms. Approximately $102 million was

59. Drawn from U.S. Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal
Sentences. See app. H.
60. Calculated from the number of sentences, mean length of sentence drawn from the
U.S. Sentencing Commission Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences and the 2019
average American life span of 78.8 years old. See ELIZABETH ARIAS, BETZAIDA TEJADAVERA & FARIDA AHMAD, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., PROVISIONAL LIFE EXPECTANCY
ESTIMATES
FOR
JANUARY
THROUGH
JUNE,
2020
(2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsrr/VSRR10-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN2L-T3LQ].
61. See id.
62. See app. C.
63. Calculated from 2019 average American life span of 78.8 years old. See ARIAS ET
AL., supra note 60.
64. Calculated as total prison years times Annual Determination of Average Cost of
Incarceration Fee (COIF) for FY 2018 COIF, which was $37,449. See Annual
Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration Fee (COIF), 84 Fed. Reg. 63,891 (Nov. 19,
2019).
65. See app. D.
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committed to the federal imprisonment of people convicted of marijuana
trafficking in the 2020 fiscal year.66
C. Changes in Rates of Convictions
Those with federal marijuana charges are increasingly less likely to be
convicted. In 2012, 8% of all federal marijuana charges resulted in a
dismissal, equivalent to the average rate of dismissal among all federal
charges.67 Yet, the rate of dismissals has climbed year after year for
marijuana charges while overall rates of dismissals have remained
relatively steady.68 By 2020, 22% of all federal marijuana charges were
ultimately dismissed.69 Rates of dismissals for marijuana possession
charges have risen higher than for marijuana trafficking, but dismissals of
both have become increasingly more common. 70 Specifically, 45% of all
federal marijuana possession charges were dismissed in 2020, up from 15%
in 2012.71 Today, 12% of all federal marijuana trafficking charges are
ultimately dismissed relative to just 7% in 2012.72 While the rates of
dismissals might explain some of the decline in federal marijuana
sentences, it does not explain the bulk of the decline over time.
D. Changes in Law Enforcement Seizures
The significant decline in the number of marijuana sentences imposed in
federal courts over the last decade is likely in large part the direct result of
a significant decline in marijuana seized by the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). Since 2012, both marijuana sentences73 and DEA

66. See id.
67. Table D-4. U.S. District Courts — Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Type of
Disposition and Offense, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2012, U.S.
CTS. [hereinafter 2012 Data, U.S. CTS.], https://www.uscourts.gov/file/10681/download
[https://perma.cc/DJ5T-VBXK] (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
68. See id.
69. See Table D-4 — U.S. District Courts — Criminal Judicial Business (September 30,
2020),
U.S.
CTS.
[hereinafter
2020
Data,
U.S.
CTS.],
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_d4_0930.2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4987-YV5R] (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
70. Counts for marijuana trafficking include trafficking, sale, distribution, importing,
exporting, and manufacturing. See id.
71. Compare id. (finding that 209 out of a total 468 marijuana possession cases were
dismissed in 2020), with 2012 Data, U.S. CTS., supra note 67 (listing that 239 out of 1,613
marijuana possession cases were dismissed in 2012).
72. Compare 2020 Data, U.S. CTS., supra note 69 (finding that 336 out of a total 1,531
marijuana cases were dismissed in 2020), with 2012 Data, U.S. CTS., supra note 67 (listing
that 680 out of 8,361 marijuana cases were dismissed in 2012).
73. Drawn from U.S. Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal
Sentences. See app. H (listing data sources); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2020, supra note
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marijuana seizures have declined by roughly 85%.74 The DEA attributes
the decline in marijuana seizures to state-level changes in marijuana laws,
leading to significantly more domestic marijuana production and less
trafficking of marijuana over international borders.75
E. Demographics of a Changing Enforcement Landscape
The geography of federal marijuana prosecutions has also evolved in the
last decade. In 2012, only 29% of federal marijuana sentences were
imposed in districts not at the U.S.-Mexico border.76 As of 2020, 47.5% of
all federal marijuana sentences are imposed in non-border districts.77
Reports from the DEA indicate that marijuana seizures at the southern U.S.
border have dwindled as states have legalized adult use and medicinal use
of marijuana, suggesting that reduced trafficking over the southern border
accounts for both the reduced number and changing location of federal
prosecutions of marijuana offenses.78 Nonetheless, though shrinking in

58 (based on information drawn from “FY 2016 through FY 2020 Datafiles, USSCFY16USSCFY20”); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2016, supra note 58 (based on information drawn from
“2012 through 2016 Datafiles, USSCFY12-USSCFY16”); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2012,
supra note 58 (information drawn from “2008 through 2012 Datafiles, USSCFY08USSCFY12”).
74. Compare DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 2015 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT
ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 127 tbl.B11 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 NAT’L DRUG THREAT
ASSESSMENT
SUMMARY],
https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/
2015%20NDTA%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T6R-UTBR] (showing a decline in
marijuana seizures of 1.19 million in 2014 from 2.33 million in 2010), with DRUG ENF’T
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 2020 DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL DRUG
THREAT ASSESSMENT 57 fig.49 (2021) [hereinafter 2020 DRUG ENF’T ADMIN. NAT’L DRUG
THREAT
ASSESSMENT],
https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/DIR-00821%202020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%20Assessment_WEB.pdf
[https://per
ma.cc/W6D8-HD2J] (citing the Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program (a
DEA program) in coordination with state and local LE agencies) (showing a decline in
marijuana seizure from 886,200 in 2015 to 309,012 in 2019).
75. See app. E; see also DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 2019 DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 88 (2019),
https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/2019-NDTA-final-01-14-2020_Low_WebDIR-007-20_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/GCF8-6EQ7] (“According to [Custom and Border
Protection (CBP)] information, marijuana seizures along the [Southwest border] have
continued to decline as domestic production increases.”).
76. Drawn from U.S. Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal
Sentences. See app. H. Border districts are defined as Southern California, Arizona, New
Mexico, Western Texas, and Southern Texas. All other districts are considered to be nonU.S.-Mexico border districts.
77. Drawn from U.S. Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal
Sentences 2019–2020. See app. H.
78. Compare 2015 NAT’L DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT SUMMARY, supra note 74, at 71
(noting “decline in the total weight of marijuana seizures along the Southwest Border” may
be caused by the “possible impact of domestic legalization initiatives” while still noting
“marijuana seizures along the Southwest Border totaled over 984,600 kilograms in 2014”),
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relative size, there were still more than 1,000 people — mostly people of
color — sentenced in federal court for marijuana trafficking in fiscal year
2020. Specifically, of the 1,129 federal defendants sentenced for marijuana
trafficking in 2020, according to USSC data, 200 were Black and 701 were
Hispanic, with a total of over $100 million committed to the incarceration
of defendants for activities not dissimilar from the activity now conducted
by licensed, regulated commercial business in states in which marijuana
has been legalized for various purposes.79
Notably, the racial composition of persons sentenced in federal court for
marijuana offenses has evolved as the caseload has shrunk. In 2012, the
majority sentenced for marijuana offenses were Hispanic (66.4%),
followed by white (22.2%), Black (8.3%), and Other Races (3.1%).80 In
2020, the majority were still Hispanic (62.1%), followed now by Black
(17.7%), white (14.9%), and Other Races (5.1%).81 The proportion of
white federal marijuana defendants has been consistently falling since
1997, while there has been a considerable relative growth in the percentage
of Black marijuana defendants being sentenced in the federal system during
the modern period of state marijuana legalization reforms. 82
These data suggest that white people are benefiting relatively more from
fewer federal marijuana prosecutions and sentences. The recent doubling
in the relative percentage of Black offenders subject to federal marijuana
sentencing is particularly notable and disconcerting at a time when
marijuana reforms are now being more robustly promoted in the name of
racial justice.83 Though a fewer absolute number of Black defendants were
sentenced in federal court for marijuana offenses in 2020 than in 2012,
proportionately more white people benefitted from the reduction in the

with 2020 DRUG ENF’T ADMIN. NAT’L DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 74, at 58
(stating “marijuana seizures along the [Southwest Border (SWB)] have continued to decline
as domestic production increases” and noting the “total weight [of marijuana] seized by
CBP along the SWB was 248,585 kilograms in 2019”).
79. Number of sentences and demographics of those sentenced drawn from U.S.
Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2019–2020. See app. H.
Cost estimates — calculated as total prison years times Annual Determination of Average
Cost of Incarceration Fee (COIF) for FY 2018 COIF — were $37,449. Annual
Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration Fee (COIF), 84 Fed. Reg. 63,891 (Nov. 19,
2019).
80. Drawn from U.S. Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal
Sentences. See app. H.
81. Drawn from U.S. Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal
Sentences 2019–2020. See app. H.
82. See app. F. The United States Sentencing Commission introduced a new variable in
the USSC Datafiles to capture both race and ethnicity in 1997. Thus, comparisons to 1996
could not be made.
83. Drawn from U.S. Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal
Sentences 2019–2020. See app. H.
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federal marijuana caseload.84 The racial patterns emerging within modern
federal marijuana enforcement seem to exacerbate a racially skewed
modern marijuana landscape in which some profit from the demand for
marijuana without facing federal prosecution while others are prosecuted
and imprisoned for similar activity. Notably, 80% of those sentenced for
trafficking marijuana in the federal system are Black or Hispanic,85 while
only 10% of marijuana business owners are Black or Hispanic.86
Notably, some recent research has provided reasons to be hopeful that
historic and pernicious racial disparities in national punishment practices
and in federal drug sentencing have been declining in recent years. The
Council on Criminal Justice in a 2019 report, for example, detailed that
from 2000 to 2016, racial and ethnic disparities declined across prison, jail,
probation, and parole populations in the United States.87 Professor Michael
Light has also recently documented that the average sentencing difference
between Black and white drug defendants in federal courts shrunk
considerably between 2009 and 2018.88 Yet, the federal marijuana
sentencing data assembled here provide a sobering reminder that even
overall declines in certain forms of drug enforcement can still prove to
disadvantage, relatively speaking, populations historically subject to
disproportionate punitive drug regimes.
CONCLUSION
New state laws legalizing marijuana for various purposes have prompted
evolving federal enforcement policies even as the blanket federal marijuana
prohibition has remained unchanged in the law. Examined through the lens
of actual federal sentences imposed, federal marijuana enforcement has
changed considerably: when states first enacted medical marijuana reforms
beginning in 1996, the number of federal marijuana sentences grew to
historic highs.89 However, after Colorado and Washington legalized

84. See app. H.
85. Based on FY 2020 estimates from the USSC Individual Offenders Fiscal Year 2020
datafile. See app. H.
86. See app. G; see also Eli McVey, Chart: Percentage of Cannabis Business Owners
and Founders by Race, MJBIZDAILY (Dec. 17, 2021), https://mjbizdaily.com/chart-19cannabis-businesses-owned-founded-racial-minorities/ [https://perma.cc/PPK5-KX7E].
87. See WILLIAM J. SABOL, THADDEUS L. JOHNSON & ALEXANDER CACCAVALE, COUNCIL
ON CRIM. JUST., TRENDS IN CORRECTIONAL CONTROL BY RACE AND SEX 1 (2019),
https://counciloncj.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Trends-in-Correctional-ControlFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9F8-C2PM].
88. See Michael T. Light, The Declining Significance of Race in Criminal Sentencing:
Evidence from US Federal Courts, 100 SOC. FORCES 1110, 1114 (2021).
89. See supra text and notes 53–56 (discussing data drawn from U.S. Sentencing
Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences. Also see Appendix H).
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recreational marijuana and additional states followed suit, marijuana traffic
over the southern border declined and the number of federal marijuana
sentences declined dramatically from 2012 to 2020.90 Furthermore, as
marijuana trafficking across the border and federal prosecutions declined,
the landscape of federal prosecutions started shifting from rural and urban
communities along the Southern border to more cities and towns
throughout the United States.91
The decline of federal marijuana sentences has not benefitted all persons
equally. Trends in these sentences indicate that reductions in enforcement
have disproportionately benefited white populations as the share of
sentenced federal marijuana defendants who are Black has increased.
White people are increasingly more likely to be avoiding federal
prosecution even though they are also more likely to be beneficiaries of
flourishing legal marijuana industries comprised of overwhelmingly white
marijuana business owners.
A number of members of Congress have put forward federal marijuana
reform proposals that aspire to advance racial and social justice in light of
long-standing racial disparities in marijuana enforcement at all levels.
Whatever the fate of these federal proposals, advocates of marijuana reform
should notice that there are developments to celebrate in the recent pattern
of federal marijuana sentences, but also that there is still considerable work
to be done.

90. See supra note 78. Additional data sources drawn from U.S. Sentencing
Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2019–2020. See app. H.
91. See supra text and notes 66–70.
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APPENDIX B
Figure 2: Federal Marijuana Trafficking Sentences Imposed in 2012, 2016,
and 2020

APPENDIX C
Figure 3: Approximate Collective Lifespans Lost to Federal Marijuana
Trafficking Imprisonment
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APPENDIX D
Figure 4: Approximate Incarceration Expenses Committed to Marijuana
Sentences

APPENDIX E
Figure 5: Marijuana Seized in Kilograms from 2012–2019
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APPENDIX F
Figure 6: Racial Composition of Marijuana Trafficking Sentences Imposed
by Year

APPENDIX G
Figure 7: Racial Composition of those Sentenced for Marijuana and the
Marijuana Industry
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APPENDIX H
Data Sources
To find datafiles on the United States Sentencing Commission’s
Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences, datafiles for 2016–2017, 2017–
2018, 2018–2019, 2019–2020 may be found on their website. See
Commission
Datafiles,
U.S.
SENT’G
COMM’N,
https://www.ussc.gov/research/datafiles/commission-datafiles
[https://perma.cc/ASL6-C67L] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
For data prior to 2016–2017, please see the data sources listed below.
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2015–2016, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N (May 23, 2018), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36962.v1
[https://perma.cc/T6EX-V3BN].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2014–2015, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N (Nov. 9, 2016), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36571.v1
[https://perma.cc/QX5Q-U3KD].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2013–2014, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N (Oct. 26, 2016), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36568.v1
[https://perma.cc/72ZB-4UDK].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2012–2013, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N (Nov. 25, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR35345.v1
[https://perma.cc/L3K5-6F99].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2011–2012, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N (Nov. 25, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR35342.v1
[https://perma.cc/D4SA-N8PN].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2010–2011, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N (Oct. 28, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR35339.v1
[https://perma.cc/XD2P-EJTR].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2009–2010, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N (Oct. 28, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR35336.v1
[https://perma.cc/E2J8-SX6F].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2008–2009, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N (Oct. 28, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR28602.v1
[https://perma.cc/2KTX-9YV6].
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Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2007–2008, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N (June 25, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR25424.v2
[https://perma.cc/ZKT9-3CKW].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2007, U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N (June 25, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR22623.v2
[https://perma.cc/M2LT-DXLP].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2006, U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N (June 25, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR20120.v2
[https://perma.cc/K5TE-NEE7].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2005, U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N (June 25, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04630.v2
[https://perma.cc/7V7E-MTHG].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2004, U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N (June 25, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04633.v2
[https://perma.cc/UKA4-DXDG].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2003, U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N (June 25, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04290.v3
[https://perma.cc/QV2C-HS69].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2002, U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N (June 25, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04110.v1
[https://perma.cc/H7YJ-V3MG].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 2001, U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N (June 25, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03497.v1
[https://perma.cc/Q5W7-8X5U].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 1999–2000, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N (June 25, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03496.v1
[https://perma.cc/M68X-KK9P].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 1998–1999, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N (June 25, 2014), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03106.v1
[https://perma.cc/5R4J-F6JE].
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 1987–1998, U.S.
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[https://perma.cc/K8NE-EKL9].

